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Abstract
For centuries the world’s biggest breweries, including Anheuser-Busch InBev and
MillerCoors, have been producing America’s favorite beers like Budweiser and Coors
Light. However, more recently smaller, craft breweries have seen significant expansion
as a growing number of Americans are drinking craft beers. How has this recent trend
affected the beer market in the United States? More specifically, how has the recent
success of craft breweries affected Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors? I examine
the economic factors that have led to craft beer’s success in a highly competitive market,
and further, how this success has impacted Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors. My
study reveals that the premier quality of craft beer has distinctively separated itself from
the traditional American lagers, like Coors and Bud Light. Furthermore, as the United
States has experienced economic growth, more and more Americans are choosing craft
beers over these American lagers. In final, I examine and explain Anheuser-Busch InBev
and MillerCoors’ recent multi-billion dollar investments into the craft beer industry.
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I.

Introduction

The United States beer industry has a rich history littered with household names
like Budweiser, Miller, and Coors. These names have come to represent the roots of
American brewery tradition. And for those who fancy themselves ‘beer connoisseurs’,
craft breweries have always offered beers with more flavor and taste than the traditional
Bud Light or Coors Light (See Figure 1 for list of beer industry definitions). Recently, the
craft beer industry has emerged to quickly become the fastest growing segment of the
beer industry for the past two decades1. The growing popularity of these specialized
products has ignited an emerging customer market throughout the United States. As
portions of the U.S. beer consumer population began to acquire the taste for these craft
beers, many became captivated and began seeking a wider variety of craft beers. The
revolution of the beer consumer has caused a chain reaction affecting the way grocery
stores, liquor stores and bars think all around the nation. Grocery and liquor stores have
expanded their alcohol sections and begun to carry local beers, while bars and pubs have
started to rotate their draft beers in an attempt to satisfy all customers’ demands. This
revolution in beer consumption has changed the shape of the beer industry in the United
States.
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This combination of a rapidly growing craft beer industry and a plateauing, or
even declining, U.S. non-craft beer industry has brought to the surface many questions
about how the two will coexist in the United States beer market. The purpose of this
study is to investigate the effect that the growing popularity of the craft beer industry has
had on the large brewing companies in the United States, particularly Anheuser-Busch
InBev (AB InBev) and MillerCoors. Additionally, this paper will forecast how this
rivalry between craft beer and non-craft beer segments will affect the way the beer
market in the U.S. looks in the future.
This paper proceeds in the following order. The conclusion of section I present a
brief history of the beer industry in the United States as well as a literature review of
previous studies on relevant topics. Section II offers economic theories that are relevant
in explaining the success of craft breweries in an industry previously dominated by
American lagers. I will examine how MillerCoors and AB InBev have responded to the
craft industry’s sustained growth in section III. Section IV will forecast how this
relationship will affect the overall beer market in the near future. Finally, section V will
provide a summary and conclusion along with a discussion of the further studies that can
be done on this topic.

History of the Beer Industry in the United States

Before congress passed the Prohibition act (the 18th Amendment) in 1920, beer
was primarily produced and consumed locally in the United States. The beer industry was
widely popular in the early 1900s and consisted of over 1,300 breweries that produced
3

approximately 57.4 million barrels annually. In the 13 years which ensued between the
implementation of the 18th Amendment and the 21st Amendment repealing prohibition,
the number of brewers in the United States had dwindled to less than three dozen. The
21st Amendment was met with a large demand for beer due to a lack in capacity from the
remaining breweries2.
This immense unmet demand sparked a race for economies of scale3 in the quality
production of largely undifferentiated products4. In order to meet this demand, breweries
began producing beer as quickly and cost effectively as possible. This efficient
production resulted in an increase in the number of substitute products manufactured by
breweries across the United States. The invention of refrigeration was revolutionary in
beer production, making it possible to easily ship products long distances. This change in
transportation opened the door for centralized mass production5. As larger firms were
able to take advantage of the economies of scale, they were also able to produce beer at
the lowest prices and push competitors without the ability to manufacture at these low
prices out of the market6. Additionally due to brewers newfound ability to transport
products efficiently, those who produced beer at the cheapest prices, set a minimum
efficient scale (MES) that had to be met by all brewers nationwide to avoid being pushed
out of the market place7. As inefficient breweries were forced to exit the market, they
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were engulfed by breweries that were able to meet the MES. This process of acquiring
failing firms allowed the successful, or most efficient, firms to use the assets of the
failing firms. This further enabled successful firms to cheaply expand their operations
and continue to take advantage of economies of scale. This strategy decreases average
cost and results in an increase of the minimum efficient scale8. This circular effect
resulted in an accelerated repeating cycle of increasing the MES, which led to the
acquisition of inefficient firms. Therefore economies of scale increased, which again
resulted in an increase in the MES and so on and so forth9. Also, the largest breweries
began to engage in huge advertising campaigns, abled by the advent of national
television, in fights for market superiority, which contributed to increases in fixed costs
that many brewers couldn’t afford, and thus were forced out of the market10.
In 1950 the minimum efficient scale for a brewery was defined by an annual
production of 100,000 barrels. By 2000, due to the severe concentration in the market,
the necessary annual production to reach MES was 18 million barrels, or nearly 9.9% of
the total market share11. This concentration went unopposed by consumers because as the
market became increasingly concentrated, big brewers were able to pass on their
efficiencies to consumers, successfully lowering the real price of beer by 11% from 1960
to 1970, and another 19% from 1970 to 198012. This war of attrition continued until the
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largest three breweries (Miller, Coors and Anheuser-Busch) produced almost 85% of the
beer consumed in the United States13.
While striving to take full advantage of increasing economies of scale, domestic
beer became light, tasteless and uniform. However, continued economic prosperity in the
U.S. contributed to an increase in the demand for a wider variety of beers14. Then, along
came Fritz Maytag, who bought the San Francisco based brewery, Anchor Brewing
Company in 1965. Maytag began producing more full-bodied and complex beer that
spurred great interest from consumers. By 1975 Anchor Brewing had reached sales of
7,500 barrels a year and after just 7 years, sales were at 28,000 barrels annually. Maytag
spurred a craft brewing revolution, and in no time the I-5 corridor from San Francisco to
Seattle was littered with craft breweries15. By the end of 1982 there were only 75 craft
breweries in the US. 16 years later, in 1998, there were 1,074 and by 2014 the number of
craft breweries in the United States had reached 3,418.16.

Literature Review

Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) conducted a study to investigate the change in
the United States beer industry from the Prohibition era to its current state. They found
that the beer market became heavily concentrated due to severe efficiencies captured
through mergers and acquisitions of failing firms. Additionally they found that breweries
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continued to strive to increase the minimum efficient scale. Those unable to meet the
MES were ultimately forced out of the market. Tremblay and Tremblay go on to explain
that as each of these breweries continued to grow, advertising became more important in
order for breweries to convince customers their product was superior to their competitors,
despite the fact that the products continued to be highly undifferentiated. Later in the
book they explain how overall economic growth and stability in the U.S. in the 1980s
contributed to changes in demand, specifically an increase in demand for a wider variety
and higher quality of beer. Also, they explain how certain laws and taxes were able to
stimulate the growth of the craft beer industry. Specifically, the increase of the excise tax
in 1977 and 1991 for the largest brewers and the legalization of home brewing in 1979
propelled craft beer success. However, the paper does end by predicting that the craft
beer industry may one day be able to capture 5% of all beer sales and by 2014 this
number was already up to 11%.
A study by Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) investigates the success of
microbreweries in a market dominated by mass-production breweries. They apply the
resource partitioning theory to the beer industry in the US. During the study they reveal
that large generalist-firms aim to capture the majority of a consumer base through price
competition, and these organizations fight for the largest share of consumer resources.
Since everyone strives to capture the largest portion of the market place, those producing
general beers face the toughest competition. In competing for the largest market segment,
the generalists fail to capture small segments of the market that require higher costs.
However, it is most likely not worth the excessive costs to capture minimal additional
market share. These niches are filled by specialists firms who produce a higher quality
7

product which appeals to a smaller portion of the consumer population. In the end, they
find that generalists, or mass-producing breweries, are targeting a heterogeneous segment
of the market, while craft breweries, choose to target homogeneous segments. Later in the
study, Carroll and Swaminathan explain that instead of aiming to capture specialists’
market segments, which would be inefficient due to a lack of experience, generalists form
alliances with craft breweries in order to capture these small market segments. They
support this argument with a comparison to the airline industry, where large companies
(ie. United Airlines) align with smaller passenger service airlines (ie. United Express) to
capture peripheral markets.
Swann (2012) explores the transformation of the English brewing industry from
1900-2004. From 1900-1970 the beer market experienced high concentration, followed
by a period of horizontal dispersion from 1970-2004. Swann credits the concentration of
the beer market to four different factors. First being the large economies of scale that
were found in the production, purchasing, distribution, advertising and marketing steps of
the process. However, breweries were only able to take advantage of these efficiencies
because of improved transportation through railways (2) and scientific advancements that
allowed for beer to be stored in a keg which prevented it from going bad (3). And fourth,
the presence of so-called Galbraith consumers, consumers whose tastes and buying
behavior are receptive to advertising and marketing which allowed them to be influenced
by large breweries. Next, from 1970-2004, there was a resurgence of small breweries
throughout the country in the beer market. This resurgence followed the formation of a
consumer pressure group, CAMRA (Campaign for Real Ale), who advocated for an
increase in the variety of beers produced by the large breweries. Due to a lack of
8

economies of scope17 within the large breweries at the time, they were unable to capture
these new unmet demands. Swann goes on to explain that economies of scope in the
brewing process are often only found in advertising, marketing and distribution, yet not
in production. This created a window in the market for craft breweries to step in and meet
those demands for an increase in varieties of beer.
Similar to Swann’s study, Milne and Tufts (1993) focus on the success of
Canadian microbreweries. They begin by illustrating that market saturation, rapidly
changing consumer demand, and intensified competitive pressures that destroyed the
‘Fordist’ model. The Fordist model labels a market that exemplifies the dominance of
large vertically integrated companies that produce similar products. The replacement
model describes a more competitive environment with increased stress on innovation and
the quality of products. Also, this new model produces an advantage for the small firms
who are able to quickly react to abrupt changes in consumer demand. As a response to
these market shifts, large breweries focused on becoming even more efficient through
improving technologies, restructuring the company, and closing inefficient plants. These
improvements to efficiency decreased unnecessary expenses and lowered average costs
by centralizing the production process. Additionally, large firms began producing ‘fullbodied’ ales, hoping to capture changes in consumer demand, but a lack of experience in
the craft industry resulted in limited success with this strategy. Milne and Tufts also
acknowledge that small breweries may be able to become more efficient through forming
alliances with other small breweries. These alliances would allow them to save on
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advertising and marketing expenses, as well as subcontracting out elements of the
brewing process like bottle washing and delivery.
In a more recent study, Clemons, Gao and Hitt (2006) look into the
effectiveness of product differentiation in the craft beer industry based on the theories of
hyperdifferentiation and resonance marketing using online reviews. Hyperdifferentiation
is the belief that firms are now so advanced that they are able to produce any product a
consumer may demand, and manage the complexity of their diverse product portfolios.
On the other hand, resonance marketing claims that the most informed consumers will
only purchase products that they deeply desire. In the study they reveal that as an increase
in product differentiation occurs, consumer informedness becomes a large determinant of
the willingness-to-pay. The more the consumer knows about this hyperdifferentiated
product, the more likely they are to pay a premium price for it. Another factor of a
consumer’s willingness-to-pay is the availability of perfect or near substitutes. Through
the resonance marketing technique of developing products that consumers truly love,
producers paint the illusion that there are very limited substitutes in the marketplace,
which increases the consumer's willingness-to-pay. In last part of the study the authors
allude to the mass-producing beer market aiming to manufacture a middle-of-the-road
product that can satisfy a wide array of consumers. The craft beer industry was
susceptible to hyperdifferentiation and therefore required a deeper love for the
specialized product that made all other potential substitutes not fit for comparison.

II.

Additional Economic Principles
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Multiple economic theories help explain the continued success of the craft
brewing industry, and declining popularity of traditional American lagers. First, there has
been a drastic shift in consumer preferences, which has resulted in consumer demand
unmet by the traditional strategies of AB InBev and MillerCoors. These shifts in
consumer demand caused deep-rooted market segmentation in the type of products that
producers are able to offer consumers. Secondly, the resource partitioning theory
provides beneficial insight as to why craft breweries are able to sustain continued growth
in an industry previously dominated by megabreweries. Additionally, within the resource
partitioned industry, hyperdifferentiation, resonance marketing and the omnipresence of
the Internet all play a role in the success of craft breweries.

Shift in Consumer Preferences

The changes in demand that have resulted from a shift in consumer preferences
are the main reason the craft brewing industry has experienced immense success since the
craft brewing revolution of the 1980s. In the past 10 years, the craft brewing industry has
increased its market share in volume terms approximately 8.1%, and now 11.1% of the
all beer sales in the United States are craft sales. During that same time frame, craft
beer’s market share in dollar terms has skyrocketed from 14.3% to 19.3%.
Throughout the brewing history of both England and Canada, craft breweries
experienced similar success after shifts in demand. In England from 1900-1970 the
brewing industry underwent a period of concentration as a result of large economies of
scale. Brewers were able to expose these economies of scale with the help of decreases in
11

the cost of transportation and scientific developments that allowed for beer to be stored in
kegs for long periods of time. This trend of mass-producers dominating the marketplace
was only broken due to the efforts of the consumer pressure group CAMRA. CAMRA
urged consumers to demand a wider variety and higher quality of beer in addition to
fighting for reformed brewery licensing and reduction in excise taxes. As public demand
for higher quality beer began to increase, mass-producing breweries found themselves
unable to meet this demand due to a lack of economies of scope in production; therefore,
craft breweries emerged throughout different geographic regions to meet the local
demands for variety and quality18. Furthermore, in Canada, from 1981 to 1990 the
amount of beer consumed per capita dropped from 84.31 liters to 78.16 liters,
respectively. This drop in quantity was countered by an increase in quality of the beer
consumers preferred to consume, ultimately a result of an aging population and a trend
towards a healthier lifestyle19.
While the shift in consumer demand in the US may not be a result of a consumer
pressure group like that in England, similar forces have influenced consumers. Certain
people wish to support local businesses, others, like ‘hipsters’20, prefer to not support the
beer conglomerates and would rather try different types of ‘indie beers’ provided by the
craft industry. Once the taste for a unique craft beer was able to capture the attention of
even a small amount of people a circular chain reaction was put in motion. First, word of
mouth helped craft popularity grow, which then increased demand, leading to the
Swann, Peter. “The Fall and Rise of the Local Brew: Process Innovation, Horizontal Product Innovation
and the Geographic Dispersion of Breweries in England, 1900-2004.” Social Science Research Network
(2012): 1-23. Web. 10 Nov. 2015. 6-16.
19
Miline, S., and S. Tufts. "Industrial Restructuring and the Future of the Small Firm: The Case of
Canadian Microbreweries." Environment and Planning A 25 (1993): 847-61. Web. 02 Nov. 2015. 853.
20
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increased availability of craft beers at bars and retail locations. This increased availability
resulted in an even larger amount of people tasting craft beers, igniting the reaction all
over again. This circular reaction builds on itself and slowly builds the core group that
constitutes the craft beer consumer base. However, while consumer trends have
influenced the availability and popularity of craft beers, they have been unable to fully
replicate CAMRA ‘s movement by failing to enacting changes in tax and licensing laws.
On the other hand, shifts in population demographics, similar to those of Canada,
and ongoing economic prosperity have contributed to the U.S. population’s receptiveness
to a higher quality product21. Mirroring the Canadian population, the U.S. population is
currently aging due to the high concentration of baby boomers and trending towards
living healthier lifestyles. In addition, coming out of a recession, Americans are
experiencing increases in disposable income along with a growing percentage of
Americans are obtaining college degrees. All of these factors amount to an increase in the
level of sophistication of the US population, which has largely contributed to a preference
of variety and quality over homogeneity and quantity. Similarly, we have long seen this
shift to higher quality products in the majority of food and beverages throughout the US.
Since the late 1980s people have begun buying more expensive organic products due to
their higher quality. We can see evidence of the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for higher
quality products in today’s omnipresence and popularity of organic supermarkets, like
Whole Foods or Sprouts.
Ultimately this shift in consumer preferences, beginning with the craft beer
revolution, has resulted in market segmentation within the beer industry. This
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segmentation is exemplified in a study that revealed beer acts as a normal good with
inelastic demand, but no substitution between types of beer22. People gravitate towards
craft beers over American lagers due to a number of reasons, including; small breweries
ability to deliver high-quality products, a preference of products brewed through
traditional methods, a form of self-expression in choosing unique products from the
‘coolest’ breweries with even more unique names like ‘Hoppy Ending Pale Ale’ or
‘Beard of Zeus’, and expressing expert knowledge in the form of acting as a ‘beer
connoisseur’23. The combination of these reasons along with the formerly mentioned
changes in composition of the US population’s demographic play a major role in the
consumer’s decision to switch from drinking mass-produced American lagers to craft
beers, stimulating the growth of the craft beer industry.

Continued Success of Craft Breweries

In addition to providing further evidence that the United States beer industry is
heavily segmented, the resource partitioning theory presents strong arguments to how the
craft industry has sustained its foothold in the competitive beer industry. Furthermore,
within the craft beer market segment, successful firms are able to capitalize on the
extreme levels of product differentiation by understanding the concept of resonance
marketing and utilizing the power of online reviews.
Toro-Gonzalez, Daniel. McCluskey, Jill. Mittelhammer, Ron. “Beer Snobs Do Exist: Estimation of
Beer Demand by Type.” EconPapers (2014): 1-31. Web. 15 Oct. 2015. 18.
23
Carroll, Glenn R., and Anand Swaminathan. "Why the Microbrewery Movement? Organizational
Dynamics of Resource Partitioning in the U.S. Brewing Industry." The American Journal of Sociology
106.3 (2000): 715-762. Web. 06 Nov. 2015. 729-730.
22
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In a purely biological sense, resource partitioning occurs when a species
voluntarily chooses not to use specific resources that multiple other species already
compete for, and instead choose a less sought after resource, in effect, eliminating
competition by choosing to use entirely different resources. In relation to the US beer
industry, these sought after resources are consumers. Large generalist organizations, AB
InBev and MillerCoors, compete for the biggest resource base by producing a
homogeneous product at the lowest possible price. In this race to capture the most
resources possible, generalists experience strong economies of scale in the production
process24. As the market matures, the generalists’ competition for the most abundant
resource intensifies. However, even the largest breweries are unable to capture the entire
pool of resources. Instead, specialist firms enter the marketplace offering unique, high
quality products that target a narrow homogeneous segment of the resources25. Since
generalist, or megabrewers, can’t directly compete with specialist brewers using their
mass-producing techniques (unless they choose to use more capital which is discussed in
section VI) the market is ‘partitioned’ as specialist and generalist firms depend on
different segments of the resource base26.
Within this specialist space, an increasing number of firms entering the
marketplace have resulted in a vast array of products available to consumers. With such
a wide variety of products, firms have begun pairing hyperdifferentiation strategies with
resonance marketing to induce a stronger influence on potential customers27. As
previously mentioned, through hyperdifferentiation firms aim to create products that are
24
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so different from the other available products that there is no direct competitors. This
differs from resonance marketing, which focuses on creating products that produce the
strongest favorable responses from consumers28. By pairing these techniques together,
craft firms create differentiated products with no close substitutes that consumers love.
In addition, the plethora of information about these specialized products available online
provides consumers with accurate and detailed information on product attributes. An
example of how these three techniques work together goes as follows: craft brewers
create an extremely hoppy beer (ex. Double IPA) that appeals strictly to consumers who
like very dark beers, a handful of craft enthusiasts try the new beer, an even smaller
number ‘love’ the new craft beer and decide to post a positive review on ratebeer.com or
beeradvocate.com, then other beer connoisseurs see this review which inspires them to
try the new beer. Together these techniques create increased consumer informedness,
lack of substitutes, and strong consumer ties which results in an increase in consumer
willingness-to-pay, allowing craft breweries to charge consumers a premium for their
product. This premium in price is what allows the craft brewing industry to capture
19.32% of the market share in dollar terms, but only 11.05% of the total volume sold.
To conclude, in a highly price competitive industry generalist firms once aimed to
capture the largest amount of consumers possible. This opened the door for small, craft
firms to enter the marketplace and target narrow segments of the consumer base through
a variety of highly specialized products. Then, craft breweries launched
hyperdifferentiation and resonance marketing strategies in order to secure a strong
consumer base. These strategies paired with an increased sophistication of the American
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population have resulted in growing amounts of consumers choosing craft beers over
mass-produced American lagers.

III.

Responses from Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors

Craft beer’s volume share of beer sold in the United States has more than tripled
in the past nine years, breaking double digits for the first time in 2014. This growth has
not gone unnoticed by the megabrewers that have dominated the marketplace for the past
century29. Arguably more pressing, 2014 marked the first year in the past 50 years that
the combined volume sales of AB InBev and MillerCoors have failed to account for at
least 75% of national beer sales. This recent downward trend of the traditional American
lagers has triggered several responses from AB InBev and MillerCoors in an attempt to
win back market share. The megabrewers have responded in two distinctive forms. First,
they have focused on breaking into the craft beer industry by creating quasi-craft brands
of their own and acquiring already well-established craft breweries. Second, they have
attempted to negatively impact the sale of craft beers by using their market power to
influence distribution channels and dedicating large levels of capital to extensive
advertising campaigns.

Surging into the Craft Beer Industry

29
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After witnessing the exponential growth and continued success of craft breweries
around the nation, megabrewers decided to create and market their own quasi-craft
beers30. Due to a lack in economies of scope in the production process at large
breweries31 they were forced to create subsidiaries that were solely responsible for the
production of these new specialty beers32. However, aside from the superior quality and
additional variety, many consumers choose craft beers because they believe they are
small independent organizations, are trying to support local brewers, or simply going
against the mass of society.33
All of these reasons could potentially deter craft beer consumers from purchasing
a craft type beer that is brewed by AB InBev of MillerCoors. To avoid this identity crisis,
megabrewers separate themselves as much as possible from these products so that people
look at them as they do any other craft beer. A Coors representative was even quoted
claiming “They [the specialty products] will not say Coors. We want them disassociated
from the Coors family”34. Often megabrewers even choose to contract out the actual
brewing process of these specialty beers in order to add another degree of separation to
the process35. A tribute to megabrewers’ success, it is noted that approximately 75% of
Shock Top (brewed by AB InBev) consumers believe it is from a small or unknown
brewer36. However, recently consumers have been catching on to these deceptive
strategies and earlier this year a lawsuit was filed against MillerCoors for its false
30
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advertising of Blue Moon (brewed by MillerCoors) as a craft beer, which fails to qualify
as a craft beer by the earlier definition of a craft beers being no more than 25% owned by
another alcohol beverage industry member (refer to Figure 1)37.
Despite recent hiccups, Blue Moon (MillerCoors) and Shock Top (AB InBev) are
two of the fastest growing beer brands in the United States38. The success of these
specialty beers is a direct result of the size and market power of their parent companies.
The sheer size of AB InBev and MillerCoors allows them to pour capital into elaborate
marketing and advertising campaigns that enable these products to gain nationwide
recognition. Similarly, megabrewers are able to take advantage of economies of scope in
the distribution process as they already have well-established distribution chains allowing
for cheap and ubiquitous distribution of their ‘craft’ beers39.
Recently, megabrewers have found that the more efficient access into the craft
beer industry is through large equity investments in, and acquisitions of craft breweries40.
There are several benefits from buying an existing craft brewery as opposed to being
forced to continually produce new specialty beers like Shock Top and Blue Moon.
Megabreweries tend to target craft breweries of a specific size and location. They aim to
acquire breweries that are already well established but looking to take the next step in
growing. Typically this means an additional $10 - $20 million-dollar investment, after
the acquisition, to double or triple the capacity of the mid-sized craft brewery41. This
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mid-sized firm proves to be the ideal size because the largest craft brewers wouldn’t be as
receptive to an acquisition, while the smallest firms would lack an established consumer
base and would need additional managerial oversight. Thus, after a small investment is
used to increase the annual production capacity, megabrewers leverage their firmly
established business channels to put the product in front of a larger consumer base and
further increase their overall market share. Along with the right size, megabrewers target
firms that are located in regions where their existing lines of business are currently
struggling. Most likely, these target firms already have a strong customer base due to
their established success; therefore, by targeting well-established craft breweries, in
popular regions where they lack a stronghold in the marketplace, it serves as quick access
to a dedicated set of new consumers for megabrewers. For example, within the last two
years AB InBev has acquired Seattle’s Elysian Brewing and Oregon’s 10 Barrel Brewing,
both located in areas where AB InBev currently experiences weak sales relative to the
rest of the US.42
Investing in these mid-level craft breweries that have already experienced mild
success has proven to be more efficient than continually attempting to create new quasicraft beers for AB InBev and MillerCoors. First, both MillerCoors and AB InBev have
significant levels of cash, after all AB InBev does $47 billion in revenue annually, which
makes buying established businesses far easier than attempting to create a subsidy that
ventures into segments of the market where they lack experience. Similarly, by acquiring
these small firms megabrewers not only gain access to new segments of the market, but
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they also gain the industry knowledge and experience of the acquired firm's management
team. These intangible assets give megabrewers insights into a market segment where
they lack significant experience. Also, by acquiring craft breweries megabrewers can
simply leave the current management team in place and contribute resources to expand
the current business rather than invest time and effort into starting an entire new line of
business.
Currently both AB InBev and MillerCoors have subsidies that are responsible for
the production of their ‘craft’ beers and investments into craft breweries. MillerCoors
developed their craft and import division, Tenth and Blake Beer Company, in 2010.
Highlights of Tenth and Blake’s key deals include significant investment in Terrapin
Beer Company and the acquisition Crispin Cider Company and Franciscan Well
Brewery. Since inception, Tenth and Blake has experienced double digit growth43.
On the other hand, in addition to creating a specialized division of their own, AB
InBev owns a 32% equity stake in the Craft Brew Alliance. The Craft Brew Alliance is
composed of five different beer and cider brands, most notably Redhook Ale Brewery,
Widmer Brothers Brewery and Kona Brewing. Outside of its stake in the Craft Brew
Alliance, AB InBev’s most notable acquisitions include the previously mentioned Goose
Island Beer Company and Elysian Brewing.
These recent reactions from the megabrewers illustrate that the growing craft beer
industry has captured their attention. The megabrewers’ existing distribution channels
and large amounts of capital have contributed to the early success of their newly launched
quasi-craft beers. Furthermore, a string of acquisitions of mid-sized craft breweries shows
43
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that the megabreweries don’t intend to continue to allow the craft breweries to chip away
at their market share. See Figure 2 for a comprehensive list of AB InBev and
MillerCoors’ investments into the craft beer industry.

Further Responses from AB InBev and MillerCoors

In addition to using their resources to capture parts of the craft brewing industry,
megabrewers have also focused large amounts of capital towards marketing and
advertising campaigns. Since 2010 AB InBev has sharply increased its annual North
American sales and marketing expense by $571 million, or 36.5%. One of the most
powerful avenues of marketing for these megabrewers is sponsorships with professional
sports associations44. AB InBev and MillerCoors, the two largest brewers in the US,
sponsor the NFL (National Football League), MLB (Major League Baseball), NBA
(National Basketball Association) and NHL (National Hockey League), an effective
method of reaching a broad customer base repeatedly. It is important to note that these
contracts are specifically made between the professional sports associations and the
traditional American lagers (refer to Figure 1) of AB InBev and MillerCoors.
To highlight the strength of these sponsorships it is essential to examine the
exposure Bud Light receives through being the official sponsor of the NFL. During the
2014 season over 202 million unique viewers tuned in to watch the regular season. This
fails to account for increased per game viewership during the playoffs or the Super Bowl
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that attracts 115 million viewers for one game45. AB InBev’s previous contract with the
NFL ran through the 2017 Super Bowl; however, earlier this year AB InBev agreed to
extend the contract through the 2022 Super Bowl for $1.4 billion, which is a 15%
nominal premium compared to their previous deal. AB InBev’s vice president of
consumer connections, Lucas Herscovici, explained to the Wall Street Journal, “We’ve
done the math and wouldn’t be renewing this sponsorship if we didn’t believe it would
allow us to sell more beer.” With this renewed contract AB InBev aims to increase
exposure on social media outlets, which could help reach consumers who may not have
tuned in to the watch the NFL games. Also, they plan to leverage their new platform as
the head sponsor of Thursday Night Football to help reach younger consumers, in their
20s and 30s, who tend to start the weekend on Thursday nights46. From this deal we can
conclude if AB InBev is willing to spend over $233 million a year on a contract with the
NFL, they must firmly believe that it will help them fight the craft beer industry and
improve their declining beer sales.
In addition to increases in marketing campaigns focused on improving sales of
their American lagers, megabrewers have occasionally pointed negative ad campaigns at
the craft beer industry. Most recently, AB InBev aired an advertisement during the 2015
Super Bowl that made fun of ‘hipsters’ who enjoy fussing over their fruit flavored ales.
However, due to AB InBev’s significant investments with the craft beer industry, the ad
was viewed as hypocritical and therefore had no significant effect. After this negative ad
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ran, MillerCoors even came out with an advertisement claiming, “Every beer deserves to
be fussed over,” further diluting its potential impact47.
Aside from increased expenditures in the form and marketing, megabrewers have
leveraged their large market share to manipulate and block distribution channels
negatively impacting craft breweries. In the US alcohol industry there is a three-tier
system that aims to keep the brewing, distribution and sale of alcohol independent of one
another48. Within the three-tier system, brewers and importers must use wholesale
distributors to get their products to retail locations where they are ultimately sold to the
consumer49.
Recently, speculation has been drawn to the enforcement of the three-tier system
as it has been reported that AB InBev has been purchasing distributors throughout the
country - the most recent coming in Colorado, a craft beer stronghold50. If megabrewers
are able to obtain full ownership of the production process and the distribution channels,
their market power will increase drastically and they would have the ability to block
competitor’s products from reaching retail locations. Blocking mainstream channels of
distribution to retail locations would hurt all competitors, but the effect would be
magnified for small craft breweries.
However, even if all three-tiers are truly independent organizations, megabrewers
still have the potential to take advantage of the system. Due to their large market share,
often times MillerCoors and AB InBev are the main products distributed by the
47
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independent wholesale distribution companies; therefore, the majority of the wholesale
distributor’s revenue is coming from the megabrewers. This allows for megabrewers to
strong-arm wholesale distributors into exclusively distributing their products, which
blocks competitors and forces them to use higher-cost channels. In 2011 the former head
of operations for AB InBev, Dave Peacock, wished for greater alignment between
producers and distributors explaining that “aligned distributors only bring in brands that
compete in segments underserved by our current portfolio.”51. The pure size of AB InBev
and MillerCoors allowed them to take advantage of the well-intended three-tier system by
overpowering wholesale distributors, which forced craft breweries to use more expensive
channels of distribution.

IV.

Beer Market Forecast

In the early 2000s, beer industry experts projected that if craft breweries were able
to continue their success they might one day be able to achieve a 5% share of the total US
beer market52. They failed to predict that craft beers would soon become a major trend,
which would catapult the craft industry to immense growth, both in sales and the number
of operating craft breweries. From 2007 up until this past year, the total volume sales of
the craft industry and the number of operating craft breweries in the United States
averaged an annual growth rate of 12.6% and 11.9%, respectively, which resulted in an
11.1% total volume beer market share in 2014. While the majority of industry experts and
analysts believe that the craft industry will continue to see success as it retains its spot as
51
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the hottest trend within the alcohol industry, many disagree on the magnitude of this
continued success and the overall shape of the beer industry in the coming years. In the
coming years several factors will contribute to the overall scope of the craft brewing
industry in the US including, future market demand, possible increased efficiencies for
craft breweries, potential market saturation or bubble effects and the growth strategies of
the megabrewers moving forward.

Market Demand

First, the future market demand for craft beer is a function of the multiple factors
that drive consumption, the availability of substitutes and the potential for increased
competition. Within the beer industry craft beer performs similar to a luxury good,
achieving its highest levels of success during periods of extended economic prosperity53.
Since beginning to climb out the ‘Great Recession’ in 2011, the US has seen drastic
improvement in levels of the most significant economic indicators, including an 8.7%
increase in average household income and a 28.1% decrease in the unemployment rate,
which leads to increased demand for luxury goods. Additionally, as the US population
continues to age, as the last of the baby boomers generation is reaching their 50s in
201554, and achieve higher levels of sophistication, including 32.1% of the U.S.
population obtaining a bachelor’s degree, the demand for higher quality goods will
continue to increase as well. Therefore, while the US continues to climb out of the 2008
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recession and obtain higher levels of economic growth, the craft beer industry is expected
to continue its success.
However, the availability of close substitutes and increased competition could
adversely affect the craft industry. Within the beer industry there are three types of beer,
mass-produced American lager, imports, and craft, all of which fail to act as close
substitutes for one another55. Thus, the only adequate substitute is other craft beers, which
only encourages consumers to switch to other varieties of craft beers, ultimately
maintaining the same level of demand within the craft beer industry as a whole. One
potential antagonist to the U.S. craft beer industry is the infiltration of Canadian craft
beers in the US. Recently a few Canadian craft breweries have begun signing deals with
US distributors to increase their sales in the United States56. And due to the curious
nature of the craft beer connoisseur, this may slightly detract from US craft beer sales,
but due to the abundance of US craft breweries it will be a minimal effect.

Too Many Craft Breweries?

The number of craft breweries in the United States has doubled in the past five
years and is encroaching the record high of 4,131 set back in 187357. It is projected that
by 2016 there will be 5,200 craft breweries in the US, almost one brewery per 60,000
people. While this leaves an ample customer base for each craft brewer, some experts
fear that this bubble of craft expansion will eventually pop and the unsuccessful brewers
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will be cheaply acquired by the remaining firms58. These fears arise from the fact that
many craft brewers are forced to take on large amounts of debt to open their brewery, and
the expectation that as the market continues to saturate it will be harder to achieve
immediate success. Without adequate levels of immediate success, new brewers are
unable to pay off the interest expenses of their debt and will be pushed out of the
marketplace. However, there are still over 1,000 cities with populations exceeding 10,000
throughout the US that currently have no craft breweries.59 This confirms that there is
capacity for more firms to enter the marketplace, but strategic geographic entrance may
be essential for high levels of success.

Increased Efficiencies for Craft Breweries

The craft beer industry has captivated beer connoisseurs with their traditional
brewing techniques and bold flavors, but certain techniques may increase the efficiency
of craft brewers leading to increased profits. For some of the mid-level to larger craft
breweries, opening an additional brewing plant in a different region of the US might be a
profitable investment. Recently, Lagunitas, Sierra Nevada and New Belgium Brewing
Company have opened additional plants, each with brewing capacity of approximately
500,000 barrels a year, with room for expansion if needed60. The benefit from this type of
expansion is three-fold. First, it increases overall brewing capacity of the craft brewery,
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which is a constant problem for the majority of successful craft breweries61. Next, it
lowers distribution expenses by decreasing the distance products must travel to reach
remote retail locations in the US. Most importantly, by opening an additional location in
a new region, the craft brewery is able to expose their products to more potential
consumers. The only drawback is that some craft beer fanatics may believe that by
opening additional locations craft brewers lose some of their local-ness, which is also part
of their attraction62.
Additionally, aligning or teaming with other craft breweries may allow for craft
breweries to overcome some of the disadvantages that are associated with being a small
firm63. Although these networks will still lack significant economies of scale due to the
large variety of craft beers, they create large economies of scope in the distribution and
marketing process64. Craft beer networks allow craft brewers to advertise as a group,
decreasing advertising expenses and appealing to a wider share of the market. Also, these
networks are able to use local or regional events, like beer festivals and concerts, as a
form of advertising that reaches a wider consumer base. Likewise, distributors are more
inclined to work with groups of craft breweries since the aggregate demand for their
products is much larger than those of a lone craft brewery. Ultimately, as megabrewers
continue to swallow up existing craft breweries, the formation of these networks may
allow craft brewers to capture the benefits of economies of scope without selling out to
AB InBev or MillerCoors.
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Future Strategy of Megabrewers

However, the strategies of MillerCoors and AB InBev moving forward may have
the most significant impact on the success of craft beer in the coming years. First, like
recent events suggest, megabrewers may choose to invest in beer companies in emerging
markets. Evidence supporting this strategy comes from the recent deal in which AB
InBev agreed to acquire SABMiller for almost $106 billion65. At first glance it appears
that AB InBev’s goal is to establish a largest market share in the US beer industry,
however; the details of divestitures that must take place in order for the deal to pass
through regulations reveal that the true potential lies in China. AB InBev is expected to
sell SABMiller’s 58% stake in MillerCoors, most likely to Molson Coors Brewing, who
would continue the brewing and sale of Miller and Coors products throughout the United
States. If the deal were approved, AB InBev would be in line to acquire SABMiller’s
49% stake in the joint venture ‘Snow’, which is currently China’s best-selling beer brand.
This acquisition combined with AB InBev’s current holdings in China would make AB
InBev the largest brewer in China, as well as the U.S.66. Regardless if this deal is allowed
to pass through regulations or not, it shows that the megabrewers have a keen interest in
the emerging markets. Emerging markets such as China and India, have large and rapidly
growing populations with low incomes, which foster the perfect market conditions for
megabrewers to apply the practices they know best. In such emerging markets,
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megabrewers will once again be able to appeal to the majority of a country's population
through mass-produced products that are made as cheaply as possible. Within the U.S.,
this deal will only affect Molson Coors, who would stand to become the sole owner of
MillerCoors, but since they are already a part of this joint venture, no additional synergies
would be realized. Therefore, there are no cost savings to be passed on to American lager
consumers. In the end, if this deal shall pass Molson Coors will simply collect all of the
profits from MillerCoors instead of only a portion of them.
On the other hand, it’s hard to imagine that MillerCoors and AB InBev will
continue to let growing chunks of the U.S. beer market be taken away from them. AB
InBev’s recent acquisitions of Elysian Brewing, 10 Barrel Brewing, and Goose Island, all
within the last two years, suggest that they show no signs of slowing down their
acquisitions of successful craft breweries in the US67. Due to immense amounts of capital
as well as the steady cash flows within these megabrewers, it’s most plausible to assume
that they will continue to swallow up successful craft brewers as well as break into
growing markets they currently lack a stronghold in. Thus far, megabrewers’ acquisitions
of craft breweries does not appear to have evidently affected the product quality or
consistency of acquired firms. In the long run, greater availability of resources and
increased access to distribution channels may even help lower the price of craft beers for
the acquired firms. However, as craft breweries are bought out by megabrewers,
consumers lose the satisfaction of purchasing from a brewery that produces unique, high
quality beers. Therefore, the continued acquisition of craft breweries will negatively
affect informed consumers who prefer craft beers. These consumers will then be forced to
67
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shun products that they know are ultimately owned by AB InBev or MillerCoors and
search for new craft brewers to purchase from.
In the end, the number of craft breweries in the United States will continue to
grow due to the recent success of craft breweries and the market for craft breweries in
unsaturated areas of the United States. However, once the majority of highly populated
towns have multiple craft breweries and existing craft breweries have successfully
expanded to capture larger chunks of the craft beer market, the market will no longer
have room for new entrants. Upon market saturation, it is likely that craft beer’s share of
the overall beer market reaches or surpasses the projected 20% by 2020, but due to the
fact that some of these craft brewers will have large investments from megabrewers, it is
unlikely that by definition craft beers (refer to Figure 1) will be able to capture 20% of
the market by 202068.

V.

Conclusion

The emergence and exponential growth of the craft beer industry since its birth in the
1980s, has forced megabrewers such as AB InBev and MillerCoors to take action in order
to protect their market share of the beer industry within the United States. This study
attempts to understand how craft breweries have been able to successfully and
continuously chip away at the market share of the beer conglomerates. Through superior
quality, bolder flavors, and a wider variety of products, the craft beer industry has
successfully segmented themselves from the traditional beer market and has capitalized
68

Notte, Jason. "Why Craft Beer Will Be Almost Unrecognizable by the Year 2020." MainStreet. N.p., 29
Apr. 2015. Web. 14 Nov. 2015.

32

upon the ability to attract a different consumer base. This coincides with previous studies
that have proven craft beer, imported beer and traditional American lagers do not act as
close substitutes.69 Furthermore, craft breweries have successfully attracted a growing
amount of consumers because of the sophisticated connotation that people now associate
with choosing craft beers over traditional American lagers. Lastly, the fact that craft beer
is a luxury good has allowed the craft beer industry to parallel the recent growth of the
US economy.
The next step of this study was to examine how AB InBev and MillerCoors have
reacted to their recent plateauing of sales in the U.S., which is a large consequence of the
continued growth of the craft beer industry. Megabrewers saw they were slowly losing
market share to the craft beer industry and therefore decided launch a few new tactics to
win this share back. First, they began brewing quasi-craft beers of their own, which
proved to be successful. More recently megabrewers have turned to acquiring successful
craft breweries and investing extensive capital in order to quickly expand them. Thirdly,
AB InBev and MillerCoors have begun using their market size to block main distribution
channels for craft breweries which forces the small firms to pay higher distribution
expenses. These aggressive counter attacks to the craft industry’s growth show that AB
InBev and MillerCoors are not going to allow small craft breweries to take away their
share of the beer market.
However, craft beer has only recently, within the past 10 years, jumped from being a
minimal portion of the beer industry, to capturing almost 20% of all beer profits in the
US. If the US economy continues to improve as expected and the population continues to
Toro-Gonzalez, McCluskey, Mittelhammer, “Beer Snobs Do Exist: Estimation of Beer Demand by
Type.”
69
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change their tastes, it will be interesting to see how much more of the overall beer
demand the craft beer industry will be able to capture. In future studies it will be
interesting to examine how the operations, revenue and production process are affected
for craft breweries that are acquired by AB InBev or MillerCoors. Additionally, it would
be revealing to compare the demand for two separate craft breweries over a long period
of time, while one remains independent and the other is acquired by a megabrewery.
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Appendix
Figure 1
Definitions of Beer Industry Terms
MillerCoors - a U.S. joint venture between SABMiller and Molson Coors that was
created on October 9, 2007
American Lager - Miller Light, Coors Light, Bud Light, Budweiser, Coors etc.
Craft Brewery - must qualify as all three
1. Small - Annual Production of 6 million barrels of beer or less
(approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual sales). Beer production is
attributed to the rules of alternating proprietorships.
2. Independent - Less than 25 percent of the craft brewery is owned or
controlled (of equivalent economic interest) by an alcoholic beverage
industry member that is not itself a craft brewer.
3. Traditional - A brewer that has a majority of its beverage alcohol volume
in beers whose flavor derives from traditional or innovative brewing
ingredients and their fermentation.
Microbrewery – a brewery with annual beer production below 15,000 barrels a year
Regional Brewery - a brewery with annual beer production of between 15,000 and 6
million barrels
Large Brewery - a brewery with annual beer production over 6 million barrels
Megabrewers - the largest U.S. breweries, AB InBev and MillerCoors
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Figure 2

Anheuser-Busch InBev








Owns 32% of the Craft Brew Alliance and serves as the nationwide distributor
o Craft Brew Alliance – composed of Redhook Ale Brewery, Widmer
Brothers Brewery, Kona Brewing Company, Omission Beer and Square
Mile Cider
Acquired Fulton Street Brewery (producer of Goose Island)
Acquired Elysian Brewing
Acquired 10 Barrel Brewing
Acquired Blue Point Brewing Company
Brewer of Shock Top and Landshark

MillerCoors








Acquired minority interest in Terrapin Beer Company
Acquired Crispin Cider Company
Acquired Franciscan Well Brewery
Acquired Meantime Brewery Company
Acquired Henry Weinhard’s
Acquired Fox Barrel Cider
Brewer of Blue Moon, Batch 19 and Third Shift
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